7 research outputs found
Game-theoretic Robustness of Many-to-one Networks
In this paper, we study the robustness of networks that are
characterized by many-to-one communications (e.g., access
networks and sensor networks) in a game-theoretic model. More
specifically, we model the interactions between a network
operator and an adversary as a two player zero-sum game, where
the network operator chooses a spanning tree in the network, the
adversary chooses an edge to be removed from the network, and
the adversary’s payoff is proportional to the number of nodes
that can no longer reach a designated node through the spanning
tree. We show that the payoff in every Nash equilibrium of the
game is equal to the reciprocal of the persistence of the
network. We describe optimal adversarial and operator strategies
and give efficient, polynomial-time algorithms to compute
optimal strategies. We also generalize our game model to include
varying node weights, as well as attacks against nodes